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Abstract
Throughout history, victory in conflict has created fearsome reputations. Vic-
tory thus ensures greater allegiance of the wider population, increasing the victor’s
rents at the expense of their enemy. Such reputational concerns create two mo-
tives for conflict. When only the outcome is informative, the less feared party
may attack to show that they are tougher than expected. If the fact that conflict
occurred at all also conveys information, the more feared party may attack. If
they do not, the population view peace as a sign of weakness and switch loyalties
anyway. In this case, conflict arises to save face.
Keywords: Conflict, Reputations, Information Structures.
JEL: D74, C73, D83, F51, H56.
1 Introduction
“My view is that it is desirable to be both loved and feared; but it is difficult
to achieve both and, if one of them has to be lacking, it is much safer to be
feared than loved.”
Machiavelli 1532, pp. 59.
Writing of the principalities of sixteenth century Italy, Machiavelli recommends that
a prince should cultivate a fearsome reputation. Without it, his subjects’ allegiance,
and the wealth that they generate, may fall to somebody scarier. History is littered
with examples of conflicts that arise because leaders wish to develop such notoriety at
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the expense of a rival. These conflicts are not necessarily characterised by one group
decisively crushing another, but rather an eventual settlement, determined in part by a
third party.
The Roman Civil War of 49-45 B.C.E. arguably fits this pattern. Julius Caesar and
Pompey the Great fought many battles, but it was ultimately down to a combination
of the Roman Senate and the legion commanders which would be succeed. Victories
increased the likelihood that the Senators would lend political support one party over
the other. Similarly, legion commanders increasingly defected to Caesar as the war
progressed.
Feudalism provides many rich examples. In addition to the situation outlined by
Machiavelli, lesser nobles deferred to their liege lord to determine the territories that
they controlled. The only way to improve their own position was to convince their
lord that they were worthy of advancement. Worth was often determined by perceived
military prowess, determined both on the battlefield and in competition (e.g. jousting).
Such reputational concerns are still very relevant to understanding contemporary
conflict. The success of a coup d’e´tat, or whether a counter-coup is instigated, often
depends upon how fearful the population are of the new regime relative to the old (Jia
and Liang 2014). Empirical evidence even suggests that insurgents have sabotaged aid
programs, for fear that such programs will cause their support to wane (Crost et al.
2014). This not only demonstrates violent ability, but also highlights the importance of
the wider population’s support in a successful insurgency.
Criminologists have long agreed that creating a credible threat of violence is essential
for modern criminal organisations. The territory or market share that a gang can hold
onto is inextricably tied to the general population’s perception of their toughness. Whilst
this is particularly true of extortionists and protection rackets (Gambetta 1996; Konrad
and Skaperdas 1997, 1998), it is also important for organisations selling illegal goods,
such as drugs (Jankowski 1991; Levitt and Venkatesh 2000). In either setting, the
perceptions of the gangs’ customers are key. Which group they turn to for protection, or
where they feel safest purchasing drugs will determine the revenues each gang receives.
When deciding whether to attack a rival gang, each must weigh up the likely impact
upon its reputation ex post.
I develop a new framework in which to evaluate such scenarios. Two parties have
claims over a surplus generated by a population of atomistic observers in each of two
periods. Whilst each party can be tough or weak, the share it receives does not depend
upon ability. Instead, the observers lend their support (and hence their surplus) based
upon how intimidating they perceive a party to be relative to its rival. Developing a
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reputation for toughness, and ruining that of its rival, is thus each party’s objective.
Conflict enables them to do this. Whilst reputational concerns are clearly not the only
motives for attacking a rival (see Garfinkel and Skaperdas 2007 for a review of the conflict
literature), my aim is to identify conditions under which they do play a role.
In each period, both parties choose whether to attack their rival. If nobody attacks,
observers learn that peace prevails. They may then revise both parties’ reputations,
and the surplus is shared out accordingly. If, on the other hand, one or both parties
attack then conflict breaks out. Conflict has two features. Firstly, the current surplus is
destroyed in the fighting. Secondly, one party is declared the victor, while the other is
defeated. Tough parties are more likely to be victorious, and so the victor’s reputation
improves whilst their rival’s declines. Moreover, the mere fact that fighting broke out
may reveal information in equilibrium. This causes further reputational adjustments.
Whilst observers learn that conflict broke out, they cannot tell who initially attacked
(although they will learn this almost surely in equilibrium). Deception has a long history
in conflict, dating back to at least 2500 years (Sun Tzu c. 500 B.C.E., chapter 1, verses
18-20). It is often impossible for observers to know who fired the first shot. In more
modern times, the use of propaganda in the run up to conflict is well documented (c.f.
Glaeser 2009; Edmond 2013). Each side tries to convince the population that they have
been unjustly provoked by their rival. In this setting, such messages would constitute
cheap talk, although they are not explicitly modelled.
When deciding whether to attack, both parties act as though their actions will prove
pivotal. If a party is attacked, its own action does not affect the outcome of the ensuing
conflict. Each consequently focuses on the case where what they do matters, i.e. when
its rival does not attack. In the final period, this implies that peace prevails. Neither
party has further reputational concerns, and does not wish to lose its share of the current
surplus.
Knowing that peace will prevail in the future, both parties have reputational concerns
in period one. For conflict to be worthwhile, the attacker must expect to receive a small
share of the first period surplus should peace prevail. It has little to lose by fighting.
Conversely, its rival must receive the lion’s share, making conflict prohibitively costly for
them. Only the party with the worse peacetime reputation ever attacks. Upon observing
conflict, the observers can immediately infer who attacked. Deception does not occur in
practice.
I compare two information structures. In the first, abilities are unknown to the
parties. Although each is likely to know its own military ability, there may be uncertainty
regarding the distribution of abilities. Parties are therefore unsure whether the observers
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would view them as tough or weak if their ability were revealed. Each shares the prior
beliefs of the observers. Since actions carry no information, either peace prevails in both
periods, or the party with the weaker reputation attacks in period one. In this case,
conflict is caused by the weaker party expecting to improve its reputation, and hence its
future payoff, by attacking. Conflict occurs to prove people wrong.
I then allow ability to be private information. Whilst it is still possible that attacks
occur to prove people wrong, new equilibria become possible. Since a tough party is more
likely to be victorious, it always enjoys a higher expected payoff from attacking than
a weak party. If the breakout of conflict conveys information, observers must upgrade
the reputation of the likely attacker when a fight occurs. If peace prevails, on the other
hand, it is more likely that the would-be attacker is weak. This provides an alternative
motive for conflict. Rather than expecting a reputational gain from fighting, a party
may attack to prevent a reputational loss from maintaining the peace. Conflict occurs
to prevent the loss of face.
The remainder of the paper continues as follows. In the next section, I place the
current work in the broader literatures on conflict and on reputations. Whilst my con-
tributions are primarily to the conflict literature, I make extensive use of the tools
developed to analyse reputations. In Section 3, I outline my model. Section 4 begins by
identifying some general results which hold for any information structure. Sections 4.3
and 4.4 then discuss equilibria in the case where parties do not know their own ability
and when it is private information respectively. Finally, Section 5 concludes. Proofs are
presented in the appendices.
2 Related Literature
Conflict over resources has long been of interest to economists (since, at least, Tullock
1967). Unlike market allocations, those deriving from conflict generate inefficiencies.
Resources may be destroyed or diverted from productive to acquisitive activities. Parties
with larger military arsenals are more likely to be victorious, providing an incentive to
invest in guns (Tullock 1980; Garfinkel 1990; Grossman 1991; Hirshleifer 1991; Grossman
and Kim 1995). The marginal cost of this investment is a reduction in the quantity of
consumer goods produced, making victory less profitable. Whilst this approach has
strong foundations (c.f. Hirshleifer 1989; Skaperdas 1996), I take a more stylised route.
In the forthcoming analysis, it is only important that victory signals intrinsic toughness
to the observers. As such, I treat parties’ stocks of weaponry and military know-how as
given. They are either tough or weak. In this sense, the model represents a short-run
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analysis. Resource destruction, which still acts as a counterbalance to the incentive
to attack, is assumed to be complete in any period in which conflict occurs. Whilst
not necessary, it does simplify the analysis to allow clearer discussion of the underlying
economics.
Mine is not the first paper to identify the importance of information in generating
conflict (see Fearon 1995 for a literature review). Whilst some have considered uncer-
tainty regarding the common value of the resources being fought over (Wa¨rneryd 2003;
Chassang and Padro´ i Miquel 2010), other have treated military ability as unknown or
private information (Brito and Intriligator 1985; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1997). I take
the latter approach. Conflict can arise because both parties are too optimistic regarding
how likely it is that they will be victorious. As such, it may be the case that they cannot
reach an agreement through negotiation. These situations also create an incentive to
signal. Two recent papers have considered signalling leading to arms races (Baliga and
Sjo¨stro¨m 2004) and prevention of weapons inspection (Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m 2008). Sil-
verman 2004 goes one step further, analysing a random-matching environment in which
individual violent behaviour signals toughness. By gaining a reputation for violence, an
individual can ensure that rivals behave passively towards them. I add to this literature,
as both actions and outcomes have the potential to signal ability. Moreover, I allow
payoffs to depend directly upon reputations, by introducing outside observers.
The destruction of resources would suggest that ex ante negotiation would be more
efficient. However, such negotiation must be credible. Recently, conflict in a dynamic
setting has been investigated. When parties interact repeatedly, threats of future conflict
can lead to the signing of a social contract today (Garfinkel 1990; Azam and Mesnard
2003; Bester and Wa¨rneryd 2006). Alternatively, longer time horizons can generate more
conflict. Victory today can lead to higher payoffs in the future (Garfinkel and Skaperdas
2000). As such, costly conflict can be thought of as an investment in future gains. My
contribution is much closer in nature to this latter work. Parties have reputational
concerns. They may, therefore, be willing to forego their share of the surplus today for
the possibility of a greater share of future surpluses. Whilst ex ante negotiation is not
possible due to the short time horizon I consider, one could reinterpret my results as
identifying where the threat of conflict is credible, should negotiations break down.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first analysis to consider the signals generated
by conflict (or, for that matter, by peace). This creates different incentives for the parties
involved; those associated with reputations. Unlike previous models in the literature, it
is observers’ beliefs about the intrinsic toughness of each party, rather than toughness
itself, that determines their payoffs.
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The direct dependence of payoffs upon the beliefs does, however, create problems.
In deciding what to do, parties must know exactly how each possible action will be
interpreted. But if the action under consideration is completely unexpected (i.e. never
occurs in equilibrium), any observer belief is consistent. These models have the potential
to be plagued by innumerable equilibria, based on ‘crazy’ out of equilibrium beliefs. In
order to focus on more meaningful equilibria, the reputations literature often introduces
myopic players (Kreps and Wilson 1982; Milgrom and Roberts 1982). With a small
probability, each player always takes the same action in every period. Since each action is
allotted a myopic type, every action is observed with positive probability in every period.
Since Bayes’s rule can always be applied, there is a unique set of beliefs consistent with
any action. I adopt a similar approach, by introducing agency problems. With some
small probability the orders given by each party are either misinterpreted (as it is believed
they were at the charge of the Light Brigade) or ignored. Hence, even if neither party
is expected to attack, there is a unique way to interpret conflict.
These models commonly feature one long-run player facing a series of short-run
players (see also Fudenberg and Levine 1989, 1992).1 Importantly, it is only the long-
run player who has reputational concerns. Each short-run player is unable to make use
of the information they acquire during their interactions with the long-run player. My
model is different. Reputational externalities exist between the two parties. By choosing
to attack, a party not only affects their own reputation, but also that of their rival.
Having two parties with private information also creates the possibility of disagreement
regarding each parties’ reputation. By truthfully announcing its beliefs about the ability
of its rival, a party could reveal its own ability. This creates an incentive for a weak party
to mimic a tough party. I get around such problems by introducing outside observers,
whose beliefs do not depend upon any private information, and hence can be agreed
upon by all groups.
Reputations have been successfully applied to models of product quality. Consumers’
willingness to pay is determined by the expected quality of the product that they are
purchasing - reputation has value (Shapiro 1982; Tadelis 1999, 2002; Bar-Isaac 2003). My
model shares this feature, insofar as reputations enter directly into parties’ payoffs. I also
borrow structure from the latter papers. I first assess behaviour under the assumption
that parties do not know their own ability, before making ability private information.
1Even when considering two long-run players, the type of one player may be assumed to be common
knowledge. Only one side has reputational concerns (Atakan and Ekmekci 2012).
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3 A Model of Conflict and Reputation
Two parties, k ∈ {i, j}, share a surplus, St ∈ {0, 1}, in each of two periods. Both
parties are characterised by an innate ability, θk. They can either be tough (θk = 1)
or weak (θk = 0). Whilst ability is important in determining the outcome of conflict
(more on this below), it does not directly impact upon the share of the surplus each
party receives. Instead, this is determined by a mass of atomistic observers. Observers
do not know each party’s ability, and instead form a belief - the parties’ reputations,
µkt = Et
[
θk
]
= Pt
(
θk = 1
)
. It is these reputations that determine the share of the
surplus that each party receives. Observers’ priors regarding party k’s ability are µk0. As
information is revealed during the game, observers will update reputations accordingly.
In each period, parties either attack their rival (akt = 1) or not (a
k
t = 0). If at least one
party attacks, conflict occurs. Conflict has two features. Firstly, it destroys the current
period’s surplus: St = 0 ⇐⇒ max{a
i
t, a
j
t} = 1. Secondly, it has a commonly known
outcome: a winner and a loser. The probability that a particular party is victorious
depends upon the how its ability compares to that of its rival. If both share the same
ability, each has an equal probability of winning. If a tough party fights a weak one, the
tough party is victorious with probability 1
2
+ q for some q ∈
(
0, 1
2
]
.
Whilst conflict destroys today’s surplus, it also sends a signal to the observer re-
garding each party’s ability. I assume that the observers cannot tell who starts the
conflict2, however they do observe the outcome. This allows for deception or the use of
propaganda. It also simplifies the analysis significantly. In response, they update the
parties’ reputations in two stages. Taking each parties’ prior reputation, µkt−1, as given,
whether conflict occurs may tell the observers something. Based on this, they develop an
interim reputation by applying Bayes’s rule. Secondly, conditional on conflict occurring,
the outcome reveals new information. Since victory is positively correlated with being
tough, the victor’s reputation improves. Similarly, the reputation of the loser declines.
Again applying Bayes’s rule, the observers develop posterior reputations, µkt , for each
party.
I distinguish between two information structures. Under the first, unknown abilities,
the parties share the observers’ beliefs regarding their own ability. This may reflect
uncertainty not about their own military capacity, but rather how it compares to that
of their rival. If a comparison is difficult, the party simply believes its own reputation.
Under the second information structure, private abilities, comparison is possible. Each
party knows its own military capacity, as well as the distribution of its rival’s capacity. It
2In any equilibrium, they will learn this almost surely anyway.
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is thus in a position to know its own ability. I assume that each still share the observers’
priors about the ability of its rival at the start of the game.
The proportion of the surplus party i receives in period t is given by a sharing rule,
pi(µit, µ
j
t) ∈ [0, 1]. As I only consider the decisions of the parties, the sharing rule is
treated as both exogenous and common knowledge. I assume that pi satisfies:
1. Symmetry: pi(·, ·) is common to both parties.
2. Efficiency: All the surplus is shared. pi(µit, µ
j
t) + pi(µ
j
t , µ
i
t) = 1.
3. Gains to reputation: A party’s share is increasing in his own reputation, un-
less they are already receiving the entire surplus. pi(·, ·) is increasing in its first
argument.
Symmetry ensures that a party’s payoff is independent of his identity. Only the
reputations matter. Efficiency ensures that there is no waste in the sharing of the
surplus. The game is strictly competitive. Gains from reputation states that an increase
in reputation raises the share that the party expects to receive. Combined with efficiency,
the share a party expects is clearly declining in the reputation of its rival. Readers
familiar with the contests literature will realise that the three conditions are identical
to those used to axiomatise a contest success function (Skaperdas 1996). However,
the interpretation is different. Contests involve employing resources to increase the
probability of success (Tullock 1980). This sharing rule requires no additional resources
to be expended. Instead, it depends upon the population’s perceptions about both
parties. Whilst it still states the share of the surplus each party can expect, it does not
entail the waste of resources imagined by Tullock (1967). Party i’s discounted utility is:
pi(µi1, µ
j
1)S1 + δpi(µ
i
2, µ
j
2)S2, (1)
where the discount rate is δ ∈ (0, 1).
In order to illustrate results later in the paper, it is useful to have an example sharing
rule:
Example (Nash Bargaining) The share party i receives of the surplus in period t is
given by the solution to:
max
pi∈[0,1]
{
(piSt)
µit [(1− pi)St]
µ
j
t
}
,
which yields:
pi(µit, µ
j
t) =
µit
µit + µ
j
t
.
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Clearly, this satisfies the three conditions defining a sharing rule. The Nash bargaining
solution is always efficient. Party j receives a share 1−pi(µit, µ
j
t) = pi(µ
j
t , µ
i
t) =
µ
j
t
µit+µ
j
t
, so
the sharing rule is also symmetric. Finally, the share each party receives is increasing
in its own reputation, unless its rival is revealed to be weak. In the latter case, the party
receives the entire surplus, and so gains from reputation is also satisfied. Of course, the
Nash bargaining solution is equivalent to the power contest success function (Hirshleifer
1989).
The dependency of payoffs upon the observers’ beliefs create a common problem
in the reputations literature. Suppose parties are in an equilibrium in which neither
one attacks. Observers have no way to interpret conflict, as it conditions on a zero
probability event. Since these beliefs affect parties’ incentive to deviate, it is possible to
support a range of equilibria simple by constructing ‘crazy’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
In order to preclude these possibilities, I introduce an agency problem. Each party can
be thought of as an army. A general gives the orders, and the soldiers follow them.
With some small probability, εk ∈ (0, 1), the general’s orders are either lost or ignored.
In this case, the soldiers attack with probability ηk ∈ (0, 1). Even in the equilibrium in
which neither party chooses to attack, conflict occurs with positive probability. There
is a unique way for the observers to update reputations.
For notational ease, I will consider the limiting case when εk → 0 (in a similar
manner to Tadelis 1999, 2002). More formally, this represents a refinement of extensive
form trembling hand perfection (Selten 1978). Extensive form trembling hand perfec-
tion requires the existence of some sequence of trembles for which the equilibria of the
perturbed game converge to the equilibrium in the unperturbed game. By changing the
relative sizes of these trembles for tough and weak parties, it is possible to construct any
arbitrary out-of-equilibrium beliefs, including ‘crazy’ ones. To rule them out, I focus
on situations where both abilities of a given party tremble with the same probability.
Intuitively, this ensures that observers do not read too much into mistakes, and do not
drastically change their beliefs in light of something unexpected.
The timing in the model is as follows. At the start of each period, prior reputations
are common knowledge. Depending upon the information structure, parties may also
know their own ability. Both parties simultaneously choose whether to attack or not.
They may then suffer agency problems. If at least one attacks, conflict breaks out. The
current-period surplus is destroyed. The observers note the conflict, and generate interim
reputations for each party. The outcome of the conflict is then revealed. Observers
generate posterior reputations. If neither party attacks (either through choice or as a
result of agency problems), then the observer notes the peace and generates posterior
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reputations for both parties. The surplus is shared out accordingly. If there is another
period to play, posterior reputations in the current period become prior reputations in
the following period.
4 Equilibria
An equilibrium in this model is defined as follows:
Definition 1 Given the observers’ priors µ0 = (µ
i
0, µ
j
0), a set of strategies (attack prob-
abilities) for both parties, σt = (σ
i
t, σ
j
t ) for t = 1, 2, and a set of posterior reputations,
µt = (µ
i
t, µ
j
t) for t = 1, 2, constitute an equilibrium if and only if:
1. In each period both parties’ strategies maximise their expected payoff:
σk1(θ
k) ∈ argmax
σ∈[0,1]
{
E1
[
pi(µk1, µ
−k
1 )S1 + δpi(µ
k
2, µ
−k
2 )S2|q, µ0, σ
−k
t , µt, t = 1, 2
]}
,
σk2(θ
k) ∈ argmax
σ∈[0,1]
{
E2
[
pi(µk2, µ
−k
2 )S2|q, µ1, σ
−k
2 , µ2
]}
,
for each k ∈ {i, j} and each θk ∈ {0, 1} (if party k knows θk).
2. Both parties and the observers generate posterior reputations by applying Bayes’s
rule, given the strategies of both parties.
Each party maximises their payoff in both periods, given their information, the strat-
egy of their rival and the way that the observers update the reputations. As information
is revealed, both the parties and the observers update their beliefs accordingly. Since
each party faces an agency problem, there is always a unique way to do this, applying
Bayes’s rule.
In characterising the equilibria of this game, I will first show how reputations are
updated in more detail, before turning to the strategies of the parties.
4.1 Updating Reputations
Let σkt (θ) ∈
[
ηkεk, 1− (1− ηk)εk
]
denote the equilibrium probability that party k with
ability θ attacks. Suppose first that peace prevails. The observers learn that neither
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party attacked. They generate an interim reputation for party k according to:
µkPt = P
(
θk = 1|Peace in t
)
=
µkt−1
[
1− σkt (1)
]
µkt−1
[
1− σkt (1)
]
+ (1− µkt−1)
[
1− σkt (0)
] . (2)
If conflict did not occur, it must be the case that party k did not attack. Conditional
on being tough, it does not attack with probability 1 − σkt (1). The numerator of (2)
is P
(
θk = 1
)
P
(
akt = 0|θ
k = 1
)
, the probability of being tough and not attacking. The
denominator is the total probability that party k does not attack. Note that, if a tough
party k is more likely to attack than a weak party k, i.e. that σkt (1) > σ
k
t (0), then peace
reduces the party’s reputation.
If peace prevails, party k’s posterior reputation is identical to its interim one: µkt =
µkPt . No further information is revealed. Parties i and j receive shares pi(µ
iP
t , µ
jP
t )
and pi(µjPt , µ
iP
t ) respectively. They not only enjoy these shares in the future but, by
preserving the peace, they also receive a payoff in the current period. They share a total
discounted surplus of 1 + δ.
Now suppose that conflict occurs. The observers know that at least one party at-
tacked, although due to the possibility of deception or the use of propaganda, they are
unsure who initiated hostilities. It could be, for example, that party i attacked (in which
case the action of j would be irrelevant) or that it did not attack but was attacked by
j. The observers consequently develop an interim reputation for party i as follows:
µiCt = P
(
θi = 1|Conflict in t
)
=
µit−1
{
σit(1) + [1− σ
i
t(1)] σ
j
t
}
µit−1
{
σit(1) + [1− σ
i
t(1)] σ
j
t
}
+ (1− µit−1)
{
σit(0) + [1− σ
i
t(0)] σ
j
t
} , (3)
where σjt = µ
j
t−1σ
j
t (1) + (1 − µ
j
t−1)σ
j
t (0) is the probability that party j attacks party i.
The numerator of (3) gives the probability that i is tough and conflict occurs. With
probability µit−1, i is tough. In this case, conflict will occur when i attacks (which hap-
pens with probability σit(1)), irrespective of the action of j. If i does not attack (which
happens with probability 1− σit(1)), then conflict only occurs if j attacks. The denomi-
nator gives the total probability of conflict. Party j’s interim reputation is generated in
an identical manner. Note that, if a tough party k is more likely to attack than a weak
party k then the fact that conflict occurs improves the party’s reputation.
Should conflict occur, the outcome reveals more information. Tough parties are more
likely to be victorious, and so the outcome signals ability. Given the interim reputations,
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however, this has no strategic element. It is purely a lottery. From the perspective of
the observers, for a given interim reputation for party j, a tough party i is victorious
with probability:
P
(
i is victorious in t|θi = 1
)
= 1
2
µ
jC
t +
(
1
2
+ q
) (
1− µjCt
)
= 1
2
+ q
(
1− µjCt
)
, (4)
They win half of the time if party j is tough, and with probability 1
2
+ q if j is weak. A
weak i, on the other hand, is only victorious with probability:
P
(
i is victorious in t|θi = 0
)
=
(
1
2
− q
)
µ
jC
t +
1
2
(
1− µjCt
)
= 1
2
− qµjCt . (5)
The higher probability of victory of a tough i causes the observers to improve their
estimation of i’s ability. After the announcement of the outcome of the conflict, the
observers develop a posterior reputation if i was victorious as follows:
µiVt = P
(
θi = 1|i was victorious in t
)
=
µiCt
[
1
2
+ q
(
1− µjCt
)]
µiCt
[
1
2
+ q
(
1− µjCt
)]
+ (1− µiCt )
(
1
2
− qµjCt
) . (6)
The numerator states the probability that i is tough and victorious. The denominator
gives the overall probability of victory. Note that victory causes party i’s reputation to
improve: µiVt > µ
iC
t .
If, on the other hand, party i is defeated:
µiDt = P
(
θi = 1|i was defeated in t
)
=
µiCt
[
1
2
− q
(
1− µjCt
)]
µiCt
[
1
2
− q
(
1− µjCt
)]
+ (1− µiCt )
(
1
2
+ qµjCt
) . (7)
The interpretation is broadly similar to that of (6). Since i is more likely to lose when
weak, µiDt < µ
iC
t .
The value of conflict is now apparent. By fighting and winning, a party enjoys a
double-dividend. Its own reputation improves. Since there are gains to reputation, this
increases the share of the surplus it enjoys given the reputation of its rival. However, the
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rival has also been defeated, causing its reputation to decline. Gains to reputation imply
that the rival’s share of the surplus falls. Efficiency means that the party enjoys a further
boost to the surplus it receives. Shares are pi(µiVt , µ
jD
t ) and pi(µ
jD
t , µ
iV
t ) respectively. In
this sense, fighting is an investment in a party’s future reputation. Of course, victory is
not guaranteed. It is also possible that he loses. The investment is risky. The cost of
the investment is the destroyed surplus in the current period.
4.2 Parties’ Behaviour
I now turn to the behaviour of the parties, given the beliefs of the observers. To begin
with, I present general results which hold for either information structure. Instead, they
hinge on either agency problems or surplus destruction. The first of these states how
parties assess the payoffs from attacking or not in any equilibrium:
Proposition 1 (Pivotal Attacks) For any sharing rule and either information struc-
ture, parties choose whether to attack in each period by conditioning both on not suffering
an agency problem and on their rival not attacking.
Proof. See A.
In the event that its rival attacks, a party’s own action is irrelevant. Conflict occurs,
and the observers do not see who started it. Similarly, if a party suffers agency problems,
the original action it chose has no bearing on whether conflict occurs. It is only when
its rival does not attack (which always occurs with positive probability due to their own
agency problems) and when the party does not suffer agency problems (which again
occurs with positive probability) that their action becomes relevant. When choosing
whether to attack, each party focuses on this case. They behave as though their actions
were pivotal.
Knowing how parties assess costs and benefits, I can now start to describe their
actions in equilibrium. Parties are forward-looking, and so I apply backwards induction.
Starting with the final period, the unique actions of each party follow immediately from
Proposition 1. In period two, neither one has any concerns about the future. If either
party attacks, the surplus is destroyed. Neither receives anything. However, if peace
prevails, the surplus is maintained, and both receive strictly positive payoff. Defending
is a dominant action:
Corollary 1 (No Conflict in Period Two) For any sharing rule and either infor-
mation structure, conflict only occurs in the second period as the result of agency prob-
lems.
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Proof. See B.
Suppose that party i knows that party j was able to attack with probability one and
was intending to do so. Irrespective of i’s action, conflict occurs and the second period
surplus is destroyed. i is indifferent between attacking and not, and might as well choose
to attack. In the unperturbed game, it is possible to support an equilibrium in which
both parties attack for certain, purely because they know that their rival will attack
anyway. Agency problems rule this out. Even if a party’s rival chooses to attack, there
is always a small probability that its orders will be lost, and it will not attack. This is
the only case in which the party’s action becomes payoff-relevant, and so it optimally
choose not to attack. By doing so, the surplus is preserved. As both parties behave
identically, conflict can only occur due to agency problems.
We now turn to period one. Since parties expect to receive a positive surplus in
period two, both have reputational concerns. By choosing to attack, they give up any
surplus in the current period. However, they may improve their reputation, leading to
them receiving a larger share of the surplus in the final period. However, it can never
be the case that both parties find such a strategy profitable:
Proposition 2 (Only One Party Ever Attacks) For any sharing rule and either
information structure, if one party chooses to attack in period one with positive proba-
bility, then its rival will always choose not to attack, irrespective of the rival’s ability.
Proof. See C.
Conflict in the first period destroys the surplus. For it to be profitable to attack, it
must be the case that the attacker receives a relatively small payoff if peace prevails. In
particular, it must be less than δ, the maximum discounted payoff a party can receive
from conflict. However, as the sharing rule is efficient, its rival must receive a relatively
large share of the period one surplus. For them, conflict is prohibitively costly. If peace
prevails, the parties share 1+δ. If one party receives less than δ, their rival must receive
a payoff greater than one. Since it is always possible that the attacker suffers agency
problems, its rival strictly prefers not to attack, hoping to enjoy a large share of the
surplus in both periods. Of course, this result hinges on the assumption that δ < 1.
Whilst it greatly simplifies the analysis, the motives for conflict identified below would
not change if this assumption were relaxed.
One implication of Proposition 2 is that the observer learns the identity of the at-
tacker almost surely. For it to be worthwhile for one party to attack, the other must
strictly prefer peace. Upon observing conflict, only the party who is expected to attack
sees a change in their interim reputation. The other party is assumed to have opted
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not to attack. In principle, this could allow for deception. By provoking conflict, the
supposedly peaceful party could trick the observers into believing that its rival had at-
tacked. However, it would never have an incentive to do so. The destruction of resources
would always be too costly.
A second implication is that all the results that follow would hold if parties were to
have different information, i.e. if a party with unknown ability were to face a party with
private ability. Since only one party would ever attack in equilibrium, the knowledge of
its rival is irrelevant. Not attacking is a dominant action.
The intuition underpinning Proposition 2 allows us to go slightly further, and identify
the party who may have an incentive to attack:
Corollary 2 (Better Peacetime Reputation Never Attacks) For any sharing rule
and either information structure, the party with the (weakly) better reputation when peace
prevails in period one will always choose not to attack.
Proof. See D.
The party with the weaker peace time reputation has the least to lose from conflict.
It receives a smaller share of the period one surplus. As such, it is the one who is
likely to attack. The party with the tougher peace time reputation, on the other hand,
receives a very high payoff from maintaining the peace - the majority of the surplus in
both periods. It has the greater interest in maintaining the status quo, and hence never
chooses to attack.
In what follows, we can therefore restrict attention to situations in which µiP1 < µ
jP
1 ,
and j never attacks. We then need to explore i’s decisions. The case when µiP1 > µ
jP
1
will be entirely symmetric, only i will never attack. Of course, if µiP1 = µ
jP
1 , then the
parties share the surplus evenly, each receiving 1
2
(1 + δ). Since δ < 1, neither party has
an incentive to attack. Reputational gains can never compensate for the loss of period
one surplus. We can never have conflict when two parties have the same peacetime
reputation, except as the result of agency problems.
In the case where abilities are unknown, this is equivalent to focusing on µi0 < µ
j
0.
However, as well shall see, the situation with private abilities is more subtle. Peace
reveals information about both parties. After all, observers learn that neither attacked.
This could lead to situations in which a party with a tougher prior reputation finds itself
with the weaker posterior reputation when peace prevails. This intuition will enable us
to characterise equilibria which appear at odds with the intuition behind Corollary 2;
ones in which the party who seems tougher at the start of the period will choose to
attack.
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Note that, in this simple framework, credible commitment is not possible. Suppose
that party i wished to pay party j not to attack in period one. Since the surplus only
survives if peace prevails, i would only be able to pay j after actions had been chosen.
But then, knowing that j would never attack in period two, i would have an incentive
to withhold the promised funds. Of course, one could artificially create the possibility
of a binding social contract. In this case, the following results could be reinterpreted as
conditions under which the threat of conflict is itself credible.
4.3 Unknown Abilities
In order to make further progress, I now consider the equilibria under the assumption
that parties are not informed about their own abilities. As discussed previously, this
could represent the case in which ability is a relative measure. Whilst they know how
capable they are in absolute terms, they are unclear regarding the exact definitions of
tough or weak. In this case, they share the observers’ beliefs regarding their abilities.
When abilities are unknown, parties cannot condition their actions upon them.
Hence, whether a party attacks yields no information. Interim reputations are iden-
tical to prior ones (in both (2) and (3), σkt (0) = σ
k
t (1)). Let us assume, without loss of
generality that µi0 < µ
j
0. From Corollary 2, party j would never attack. We are therefore
free to focus on the decision of party i.3 If peace prevails, no information has been
revealed about either party. Conditional on being pivotal, i expects to receive:
pi(µi0, µ
j
0) + δpi(µ
i
0, µ
j
0).
If, instead, conflict occurs, the outcome still reveals something about the relative
abilities of the parties. When it is announced, both the parties and the observer will
use (6) and (7) to develop posterior reputations. Since party i does not know their own
ability, it believes that it will be victorious with probability:
P
(
i victorious|µi0, µ
j
0
)
= µi0
[
1
2
+ q
(
1− µj0
)]
+
(
1− µi0
) (
1
2
− qµj0
)
= 1
2
+ q
(
µi0 − µ
j
0
)
. (8)
If party i were to attack, it would therefore expect to receive:
0 + δ
{[
1
2
+ q
(
µi0 − µ
j
0
)]
pi(µiV1 , µ
jD
1 ) +
[
1
2
− q
(
µi0 − µ
j
0
)]
pi(µiD1 , µ
jV
1 )
}
.
3Of course, if µj
0
< µi
0
, the roles would simply be reversed.
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In period one, the surplus is destroyed. In period two, neither party attacks, and so the
surplus is preserved. If i is victorious, it will enter period two with a stronger reputation
and will receive pi(µiV1 , µ
jD
1 ). If, on the other hand, it is defeated, it will enter period
two with a weaker reputation and will receive pi(µiD1 , µ
jV
1 ).
Party i will therefore choose to attack if and only if:
pi(µi0, µ
j
0) (1 + δ) ≤ δ
{[
1
2
+ q
(
µi0 − µ
j
0
)]
pi(µiV1 , µ
jD
1 ) +
[
1
2
− q
(
µi0 − µ
j
0
)]
pi(µiD1 , µ
jV
1 )
}
.
(9)
The incentive to attack is generated by the possibility of proving people wrong. Since
attacking destroys the first period surplus, a party would only do so if it expected to
gain a larger share of the surplus in the second period. Since its share under peace is
determined by its prior reputation, this requires that they expect their reputation to
improve after the conflict. We have the following:
Proposition 3 (Proving People Wrong) When abilities are unknown, the unique
equilibrium involves either peace in both periods, or the party with the weaker prior
reputation attacking to prove people wrong in period one.
The exact nature of the equilibrium depends upon the functional form of the sharing
rule. Figure 1 illustrates it under Nash bargaining. The diagram shows the equilibrium
outcome for any possible combination of prior reputations. A party will attack if and
only if its reputation is low enough, compared to that of its rival. In this case, it receives
too small a share of the first period surplus to prevent it from choosing to attack.
i
at
ta
ck
s
j attacks
µi0
µ
j
0
1
10
Peace
Figure 1: Peace and Proving People Wrong under Nash Bargaining with Unknown
Abilities
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Parties with identical reputations never attack one another (the dashed diagonal
line). Each finds the loss of period one surplus too costly.
4.4 Private Abilities
Under this information structure, parties know their own ability, but share the observers’
prior beliefs about their rival. The existence of private information enables the break
out of conflict to signal information about the ability of the attacker. This information
will always lead the observers to adjust reputations as follows:
Proposition 4 (Conflict Signals Toughness) For any sharing rule, if a party is ex-
pected to attack with positive probability, attacking (weakly) improves their interim rep-
utation, whereas not attacking (weakly) reduces it.
Proof. See E.
The payoff a party receives should peace prevail in both periods is independent of
ability. Similarly, should conflict break out, the way that interim (and hence posterior)
reputations are updated is the same irrespective of whether the attacking party is tough
or weak. Given any outcome of conflict, tough and weak parties thus receive the same
shares of the remaining surplus. However, tough parties are more optimistic about
their chances of being victorious than weak ones. They are consequently more prone to
attacking. If a weak party chooses to attack, its expected payoff from attacking must
exceed that of peace. Consequently a tough party’s expected payoff from attacking
strictly exceeds that of peace. Similarly, if a tough party chooses not to attack, its
payoff from peace must exceed that of an attack. In this case, it must be true that a
weak party strictly prefers not to attack.
When a party is expected to attack with positive probability, conflict causes the
observers to improve their assessment of the likely attacker’s ability (in (3) σit(1) ≥
σit(0)). For the same reason, peace causes the observers to lower their assessment of the
party that was expected to attack. This provides a further incentive against deception, if
one were needed. By secretly provoking an attack, a party hands its rival an immediate
improvement in its reputation.
The fact that conflict improves the interim reputation of the attacker may suggest
that, relative to unknown abilities, we might expect to see more attacks to prove people
wrong. This is not the case, however:
Proposition 5 (Less Conflict to Prove People Wrong) The set of prior reputa-
tions that support conflict to prove people wrong in the first period is smaller when
parties know their own ability.
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If a party pools on attacking, whether conflict occurs reveals nothing about the ability
of either party. Conflict is always expected by the observers. In (3), σi1(0) = σ
i
1(1) = 1,
and so µiC1 = µ
i
0. Conflict destroys the first period surplus, by the outcome still yields
information, causing the observers to update parties reputations according to (6) and
(7).
If peace prevails instead, observers would view it as the result of an agency problem.
For any εi > 0, the probability that party i fails to attack in this equilibrium is εi(1−ηi).
Observers use (2) to develop interim beliefs, yielding:
µiP1 =
µi0ε
i(1− ηi)
µi0ε
i(1− ηi) + (1− µi0)ε
i(1− ηi)
= µi0.
Taking the limit as εi → 0, observers learn nothing about ability if peace prevails.
For party i to pool on attacking, it must be the case that neither ability prefers to
deviate by not attacking, thereby tricking the observers into believing that it suffered
agency problems. The equilibrium requires that:
pi(µi0, µ
j
0) (1 + δ) ≤ δ
[(
1
2
− qµj0
)
pi(µiV1 , µ
jD
1 ) +
(
1
2
+ qµj0
)
pi(µiD1 , µ
jV
1 )
]
. (10)
Equation (10) has the same interpretation as equation (9), except that a weak party’s
probability of victory, (5), is substituted in. The left-hand side gives the expected payoff
from deviating to not attacking, conditional on being pivotal. The observers view the
deviation as an agency problem, and do not alter their beliefs about party i. i receives a
share pi(µi0, µ
j
0) of both first and second period surpluses. The right-hand side gives the
payoff to a weak party from attacking. For the equilibrium to be supported, this has to
yield the weak party more.
Compared to unknown abilities, the range of reputations under which they always
choose to attack declines. Weak parties know that they are less likely to be victorious
than an uninformed party. Their expected payoff from attacking is lower. In order to
induce an attack, they must receive an even smaller share of the surplus from peace.
However, as no information is revealed when the party attacks, the payoff to peace is
unaffected. So for any prior reputation of party j, there are fewer reputations that will
induce a pooling attack by party i.
A similar logic holds for peace to prevail. A tough i is more optimistic about their
likelihood of winning a fight compared to when they are uninformed. As such, they are
more inclined to deviate from an equilibrium in which nobody attacks. The set of prior
reputations that support peace in both periods is smaller.
19
Proposition 6 (Less Peace) The set of prior reputations that support peace with prob-
ability one in the first period is smaller when parties know their own ability.
In this equilibrium, the observers only expect peace. Since σi1(0) = σ
i
1(1) = 0, (2)
suggests that µiP1 = µ
i
0. When peace is observed, no information is revealed. If, on
the other hand conflict occurs, the observers write it off as one party or other suffering
agency problems. The outbreak of conflict reveals no information about either party:
µiC1 = µ
i
0.
For the equilibrium to be supported, a tough party i must prefer not to attack. This
holds if and only if:
pi(µi0, µ
j
0) (1 + δ) ≥ δ
{[
1
2
+ q
(
1− µj0
)]
pi(µiV1 , µ
jD
1 ) +
[
1
2
− q
(
1− µj0
)]
pi(µiD1 , µ
jV
1 )
}
.
(11)
Again, comparing (11) to (9), the difference comes purely through the probability of
winning. Since a tough party i knows that they are tough, they are more optimistic about
victory. The left-hand side gives i’s equilibrium payoff from not attacking, conditional
on being pivotal. The right-hand side gives the expected payoff from deviating. By
attacking, i tricks the observers into believing that they suffered an agency problem.
Nevertheless victory or defeat are informative. For peace to be sustained, tricking the
observers in this way cannot be profitable.
For given prior reputations, the shares each party receives from peace, victory and
defeat are identical to those under unknown abilities. However, a tough party i expects
victory with a higher probability. They consequently need to receive a larger payoff
in order to maintain the peace than an uninformed party. For any prior reputation of
party j, there are once again fewer reputations that will induce party i to pool on not
attacking.
Figure 2 illustrates the pure strategy equilibria under Nash bargaining with private
abilities. For comparison, the boundary with unknown abilities is also included. Once
again, the party with the weaker reputation is the attacker. Its rival would find the
destruction of period one surplus too costly to induce an attack. The regions in which
either party attack is smaller, reflecting the less optimistic outlook of a weak ability
party. In order to induce it to attack, it must receive an even smaller share of the
surplus from peace than an uninformed party. The region in which peace prevails is also
smaller, reflecting the more optimistic outlook of a tough party.
In the darker shaded region of Figure 2, the party with the weaker reputation will
neither pool on attack or pool on not attacking. In any pooling equilibrium, only the
outcome of conflict reveals information. If, for example, conflict occurs when peace was
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Figure 2: Peace and Proving People Wrong under Nash Bargaining with Private Abilities
expected, they put it down to agency problems. In the shaded region, peace is not
possible. A tough party would rather attack, have it written off as an agency problem,
and then have the outcome of the conflict announced. Similarly, outright conflict is
not possible. A weak party would rather not attack, have it written off as an agency
problem, and enjoy the surplus in both periods.
The remaining equilibria all involve some separation between tough and weak par-
ties. As such, whether conflict occurs becomes informative. As the economic intuition
behind these equilibria are similar, I will discuss them together, rather than detailing an
exhaustive list. At least one such equilibrium exist for any prior reputations, and they
take the following form:
Proposition 7 (Conflict is Always Possible to Save Face) For any prior reputa-
tions, there exists an equilibrium in which conflict occurs with positive probability in the
first period when parties know their own ability. In such an equilibrium:
(i) the party with the tougher prior reputation may be the one to attack; and
(ii) observers believe that conflict is more likely as the attacker’s prior reputation in-
creases.
Proof. See F.
Since these equilibria involve some degree of separation between tough and weak
attackers, every outcome occurs with positive probability. Observers are never forced
to rely on agency problems to guide their inferences. In line with Propositions 2 and 4,
one party will attack with a strictly higher probability when they are tough than when
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they are weak. Its rival will not attack. In such equilibria, conflict causes the observers
to immediately upgrade the reputation of the attacking party (in (3) σi1(1) > σ
i
1(0) so
µiC1 > µ
i
0). This provides an additional incentive to attack. If, instead, peace is observed,
the reputation of the party that might have attacked immediately declines. The party
is more likely to be weak (in (2) 1− σi1(1) < 1− σ
i
1(0) so µ
iP
1 < µ
i
0).
This second effect - the decline of reputation when a party does not attack - has
the potential to reverse the intuition underpinning the previous results. Until now, it
has always been the party with the worse prior reputation that has chosen to attack.
It have the least to lose, as the lion’s share of the surplus in the current period would
go its rival. This is no longer the case. In these equilibria, not attacking is interpreted
by the observers as a sign of weakness. Maintaining the status quo may result in the
observers giving the majority of the surplus to the rival anyway. Hence even the party
who appears to be tougher prior may find itself better off attacking. Conflict is driven
by a need to save face.
An increase in the prior reputation of the attacker increases the observer’s perceived
probability of conflict for two reasons. Firstly, from Proposition 4, tough parties at-
tack with higher probability than weak parties. If the abilities of the attacking party
completely separate, then the observers expect to witness an attack in period one with
probability µi0. In a semi-separating equilibrium, one ability of the attacker is indifferent
between revealing their ability and pooling with the other ability. As the prior reputa-
tion of the attacker increases, this indifference is maintained by the ability that mixes
attacking with a higher probability. So not only do the observers think it more likely
that the attacking party is tough as µi0 increases, and is hence more likely to attack, but
they expect the tough party to attack more frequently as well.
To expand on the intuition behind this idea, Figure 3 displays the remaining equilib-
rium under Nash bargaining with private abilities. Given the form of the sharing rule,
a weak party would never wish to reveal that it is weak. Doing so would concede the
entire surplus to its rival. If such a revelation were possible in equilibrium, a weak party
would prefer to mimic a tough party, and maintain the illusion that it might be tough.
Consequently, only one semi-separating equilibrium exists. One party mixes between
attacking and not if it is tough, and does not attack if it is weak (in the case illustrated,
as ever, this is party i). The other party does not attack.
If conflict breaks out, the observers immediately learn that party i is tough. Whilst
the outcome of the conflict will have further repercussions for party j’s reputation, party
i’s is fixed: µiV1 = µ
iD
1 = 1. The payoff from conflict for party i is therefore independent
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Figure 3: Saving Face under Nash Bargaining with Private Abilities.
of their prior reputation. When attacking, a tough i expects to receive:
δ
{[
1
2
+ q
(
1− µj0
)]
pi(1, µjD1 ) +
[
1
2
− q
(
1− µj0
)]
pi(1, µjV1 )
}
,
conditional on being pivotal.
In order to be indifferent between attacking and defence, a tough i must expect the
same payoff from not attacking. We require that:
pi(µiP1 , µ
j
0)(1 + δ) = δ
{[
1
2
+ q
(
1− µj0
)]
pi(1, µjD1 ) +
[
1
2
− q
(
1− µj0
)]
pi(1, µjV1 )
}
.
Since there are gains from reputation, the payoff from maintaining peace in both periods
is increasing in µiP1 . For any prior reputation of party j, there consequently exists a
unique µiP1 (µ
j
0) that maintains a tough party i’s indifference. In any such equilibrium,
peace must lead the observers to conclude that party i is tough with probability µiP1 (µ
j
0).
If no conflict occurs, observers believe that party i is tough with probability:
µiP1 =
µi0 [1− σ
i
1(1)]
µi0 [1− σ
i
1(1)] + (1− µ
i
0)
.
By mixing with the appropriate probability, the observers can be led develop any interim
reputation for i between zero and µi0 when peace prevails. In equilibrium, a tough party
i attacks with exactly the right probability to generate the µiP1 (µ
j
0) that makes them
indifferent.
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When is such an equilibrium supported? The payoff party i earns from attacking is
less than δ. Since this constitutes less than half the available surplus from peace, it must
be that µiP1 (µ
j
0) < µ
j
0. If µ
i
0 ≥ µ
j
0, an appropriate probability of attack can always be
found to generate the correct posterior reputation from peace. So the equilibrium always
exists when party i begins with the tougher prior reputation. In this case, if conflict
were not expected, party i would receive the larger share of the peacetime surplus.
They would never choose to attack. Conflict is driven solely by the fact that observers
downgrade party i’s reputation if peace prevails. An attack is expected, and so a tough
party i attacks in order to save face. Since a symmetric equilibrium exists in which a
tough party j mixes, conflict is always possible when µi0 < µ
j
0 as well.
The boundary of the shaded region in Figure 3 gives the required µiP1 (µ
j
0). On the
boundary, a tough party i does not attack. Consequently, µiP1 = µ
i
0. They are neverthe-
less indifferent between revealing themselves to be tough by attacking and maintaining
their prior reputation by attacking. Inside the shaded region, party i’s prior reputation
is too low. A tough party i strictly prefers to attack and reveal themselves to be tough
for any feasible reputation from peace. The equilibrium is no longer supported.
Note also that the required µiP1 is independent of i’s prior reputation. If µ
i
0 increases,
for a given probability of attack, µiP1 would also increase. A tough i would prefer to
deviate and not attack. In order to prevent this, the equilibrium probability that a
tough party i attacks increases. This means that, if conflict is not observed, it is more
likely that party i is weak. The observers downgrade i’s reputation to a greater extent,
maintaining the indifference. As party i’s prior reputation increases, observers expect
more conflict both because it is more likely that party i is tough, and because a tough
party i attacks more often.
5 Conclusions
Both throughout history and in contemporary society, conflict has been used to signal
violent ability. By developing a fearsome reputation, a party (be it a prince, an army, a
general or even a street gang) can ensure the loyalty of the wider population, expanding
its sphere of influence at the expense of its rivals. With greater influence comes greater
rents.
Such environments generate two motives for conflict, depending upon how much
information is conveyed. Fighting creates a victor and a loser. When only this outcome
is informative, attacks occur in order to prove people wrong. Parties who have a poor
reputation hope that victory will improve their standing with the population, entitling
24
them to greater rents in the future. Since they earn relatively little by maintaining the
status quo, their opportunity cost of preserving the peace is relatively low. In contrast,
parties who are already feared have little to gain through further conflict. They already
enjoy large rents, and prefer to maintain the peace rather than engage in a costly war
that might result in defeat.
When the break out of conflict also signals ability, a party may attack in order to save
face. A party that knows that it is tougher than the wider population believes it to be
is more optimistic about its chances of victory than a party that knows that it is weaker
than the wider population believes. As such, it is more prone to attack. If the population
expects this, failing to attack is perceived as a sign of weakness. Loss of face causes the
party’s sphere of influence to shrink, conceding rents to its rival. Caught between a
costly war and a costly loss of face, even parties with ex ante relatively formidable
reputations can be induced to attack. Once again, their rival hopes for peace. Peace
causes the population previously loyal to their opponent lose faith, and swear fealty to
them instead. In this case, conflict is purely driven by the beliefs of the population.
Whilst the results presented seem intuitive, the model used to generate them is
relatively simple. By only allowing for two period, the model precludes sophisticated
dynamic behaviour. Whilst the destruction of surplus when conflict occurs may be
extreme, neither motive for conflict identified depends upon the level cost of conflict.
Finally, the assumption that the observers cannot tell directly who started the conflict
may rule out a pure signalling motive. If a party knows it is going to be attacked, it
may choose to attack as well, in order to improve its interim reputation.
Several extensions suggest themselves. As already noted, the short time horizon
prevents credible negotiation between the parties. As the social contract literature shows,
the threat of conflict can be used to generate peace given enough time (for example, the
Danegeld paid to the Vikings by the Anglo-Saxons in order to prevent attacks). Longer
time horizons would also raise possibility of parties investing to improve their ability.
For example, countries could elect different leaders (c.f. Jackson and Morelli 2007) or
develop new military technology. Moreover, future ability may be related to current
reputations, as receiving a higher surplus today provides more resources to invest in
improving ability tomorrow. Whilst the current (short-run) reputational motives for
conflict would still exist, these additional features would likely give rise to others.
Reputational concerns could also be applied to situations in which rival parties do not
engage in conflict with each other. For example, young Roman aristocrats would often
spend time at the borders of the empire gaining military victories in order to progress
their careers. Whilst they did occasionally fight amongst themselves, they generally
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signalled ability by defeating (or not) the Carthaginians, Picts, Huns, Visigoths etc. The
need for victories was made more acute by the victories of rival aristocrats in different
parts of the Empire.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Alwyn Young for his valuable insights and extensive comments.
Equally useful have been comments by the editor, the anonymous referees, Chris Colvin,
Giacomo De Luca, In˜igo Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Vito Polito and A´kos Valentinyi, as well as
seminar participants at Cardiff University and the Long-Run Perspectives on Crime and
Conflict conference at Queen’s University Belfast.
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Define the discounted payoff to party i in period t be Πit. Suppose that, in
equilibrium, party j attacks with probability σjt in period one. For any ε
i > 0 and any
ηi > 0, if party i chooses to attack, their expected payoff is:
(
1− σjt
) {[
1− εi(1− ηi)
]
Et
[
Πit|a
i
t = 1, a
j
t = 0
]
+ εi(1− ηi)Et
[
Πit|a
i
t = a
j
t = 0
]}
+ σjtEt
[
Πit|a
j
t = 1
]
If they chooses not to attack, their expected payoff is:
(
1− σjt
) {
εiηiEt
[
Πit|a
i
t = 1, a
j
t = 0
]
+
(
1− εiηi
)
Et
[
Πit|a
i
t = a
j
t = 0
]}
+ σjtEt
[
Πit|a
j
t = 1
]
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So party i will choose to attack if and only if:
(
1− σjt
) {[
1− εi(1− ηi)
]
Et
[
Πit|a
i
t = 1, a
j
t = 0
]
+ εi(1− ηi)Et
[
Πit|a
i
t = a
j
t = 0
]}
+ σjtEt
[
Πit|a
j
t = 1
]
≥
(
1− σjt
) {
εiηiEt
[
Πit|a
i
t = 1, a
j
t = 0
]
+
(
1− εiηi
)
Et
[
Πit|a
i
t = a
j
t = 0
]}
+ σjtEt
[
Πit|a
j
t = 1
]
⇐⇒
[
1− εi(1− ηi)
]
Et
[
Πit|a
i
t = 1, a
j
t = 0
]
+ εi(1− ηi)Et
[
Πit|a
i
t = a
j
t = 0
]
≥ εiηiEt
[
Πit|a
i
t = 1, a
j
t = 0
]
+
(
1− εiηi
)
Et
[
Πit|a
i
t = a
j
t = 0
]
⇐⇒
(
1− εi
)
Et
[
Πit|a
i
t = 1, a
j
t = 0
]
≥
(
1− εi
)
Et
[
Πit|a
i
t = a
j
t = 0
]
⇐⇒ Et
[
Πit|a
i
t = 1, a
j
t = 0
]
≥ Et
[
Πit|a
i
t = a
j
t = 0
]
.
Party i will only attack in each period if and only if it is a best response, conditional on
party j not attacking, and party i not suffering an agency problem. Each party chooses
their action under the assumption that they are pivotal. This completes the proof.
B Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. From Proposition 1, each party decides whether to attack by conditioning on
their rival not attacking and their not suffering an agency problem. In this case, if party
i attacks, the surplus is destroyed, and neither party receives a payoff. If he does not
attack, he receives pi(µiP2 , µ
jP
2 ) > 0. So party i will not attack. A symmetric argument
holds for party j, and so a fight only occurs in the second period as the result of an
agency problem. This completes the proof.
C Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. If party j chooses to attack in period one, then they destroys the period one
surplus. For this to be (weakly) profitable, it must be the case that:
pi(µjP1 , µ
iP
1 )(1 + δ) < δ.
The payoff that party j receives should no fight occur in either period must be less than
the (discounted) surplus that remains if they were to attack in period one. Since the
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sharing rule is efficient, it must be that:
[
1− pi(µiP1 , µ
jP
1 )
]
(1 + δ) < δ
⇐⇒ pi(µiP1 , µ
jP
1 )(1 + δ) > 1 > δ.
Party i gains a higher payoff by not attacking than they would from attacking, even if
that resulted in him securing the entire period two surplus. It cannot be profitable for
them to attack. This completes the proof.
D Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. Suppose that µiP1 > µ
jP
1 . If party i chooses to attack, it must be that:
pi(µiP1 , µ
jP
1 )(1 + δ) < δ.
In this case, by Proposition 2, party j would never choose to attack since:
pi(µjP1 , µ
iP
1 )(1 + δ) > δ.
Combining these two inequalities, it must be the case that:
pi(µiP1 , µ
jP
1 ) < pi(µ
jP
1 , µ
iP
1 ).
However, since there are gains to reputation, we have that:
pi(µiP1 , µ
jP
1 ) > pi(µ
jP
1 , µ
jP
1 ) =
1
2
.
So, by efficiency, pi(µjP1 , µ
iP
1 ) <
1
2
. Party i receives a higher share of the surplus if no
fight occurs. This yields a contradiction, and completes the proof.
E Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. For a weak party i, the expected payoff from attacking assuming no agency
problem is:
δ
[(
1
2
− qµjP1
)
pi(µiV1 , µ
jD
1 ) +
(
1
2
+ qµjP1
)
pi(µiD1 , µ
jV
1 )
]
,
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whereas for a tough party i it is:
δ
{[
1
2
+ q
(
1− µjP1
)]
pi(µiV1 , µ
jD
1 ) +
[
1
2
− q
(
1− µjP1
)]
pi(µiD1 , µ
jV
1 )
}
.
Subtracting the former from the latter yields:
δq
[
pi(µiV1 , µ
jD
1 )− pi(µ
iD
1 , µ
jV
1 )
]
> 0.
A tough party i always expects a higher payoff from attacking than a weak party.
Conversely, if they do not attack, conditional on being pivotal, both abilities receive
pi(µiP1 , µ
jP
1 ). The expected gain from attacking is higher for a tough party than a weak
party. So if a weak party attacks with positive probability, a tough party strictly prefers
to attack. This completes the proof.
F Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Consider the following strategy profile. Party i does not attack when they are
weak and attacks with probability σi1(1) when they are tough. Party j never attacks.
If conflict occurs, observers conclude that party i attacked, and hence must be tough:
µiC1 = 1. Party j’s reputation is unaffected. If peace prevails, then the observers conclude
that either party i is weak, or that they are tough and randomly did not attack. i’s
interim reputation becomes:
µiP1 =
µi0 [1− σ
i
1(1)]
µi0 [1− σ
i
1(1)] + (1− µ
i
0)
. (12)
i’s reputation suffers when they do not attack.
For a tough party i to mix between attacking and not, they must be indifferent
between the two actions. So:
pi(µiP1 , µ
j
0) (1 + δ) = δ
{[
1
2
+ q
(
1− µj0
)]
pi(1, µjD1 ) +
[
1
2
− q
(
1− µj0
)]
pi(1, µjV1 )
}
.
Note, however, that the right-hand side of the above equation is independent of µi0. Since
attacking reveals i to be tough, their reputation is unaffected by victory or defeat. So,
for each µj0, the above equation defines a unique µ
iP
1 (µ
j
0) that maintains a tough party
i’s indifference. µiP1 (µ
j
0) < µ
j
0, since it must be the case that pi(µ
iP
1 (µ
j
0), µ
j
0) (1 + δ) ≤ δ
and so pi(µiP1 (µ
j
0), µ
j
0) <
1
2
.
In order to complete the proof, I show that for any µi0 > µ
iP
1 (µ
j
0), we can find a σ
i
1(1) ∈
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(0, 1) that generates an interim reputation of µiP1 (µ
j
0) following peace. Rearranging (12)
to solve for σi1(1) yields:
σi1(1) =
µi0 − µ
iP
1 (µ
j
0)
µi0
(
1− µiP1 (µ
j
0)
) .
So long as µiP1 (µ
j
0) < µ
i
0 < 1 the equilibrium is supported. In particular, it is supported
for any µi0 ≥ µ
j
0. Moreover, since µ
iP
1 (µ
j
0) < µ
j
0, it must be that a tough party i
attacks with strictly positive probability over this range. The probability of attack is
also increasing in µi0. So conflict is always possible when µ
i
0 ≥ µ
j
0.
Since an identical equilibrium exists in which a tough party j mixes and party i
does not attack, conflict is also possible whenever µi0 ≤ µ
j
0. For any prior reputations,
an equilibrium exists in which conflict occurs with strictly positive probability. This
completes the proof.
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